Lisa Smith v. Kelly Services Inc by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-1-2020 
Lisa Smith v. Kelly Services Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Lisa Smith v. Kelly Services Inc" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 468. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/468 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1399 
__________ 
 
LISA MARIE SMITH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KELLY SERVICES INC; PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-03600) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 1, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lisa Smith appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment to Kelly Services, 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Inc., and the School District of Philadelphia, the defendants in her employment 
discrimination case.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Smith was a substitute teacher in a Philadelphia elementary school, but she was 
employed by Kelly Services and not by the School District.  Smith filed a second 
amended complaint, raising claims against Kelly Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 
claims against the School District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et 
seq., and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, Phila. Code § 9-1101, et seq.  She 
alleged that she was fired from her substitute teacher position in retaliation for having 
reported students’ racially abusive language, and that the students’ use of such language 
created a hostile work environment.2  Kelly Services stated that it fired Smith for 
violating its “no-touch” policy when she touched a fifth-grade student.3   
The District Court granted Kelly Services summary judgment on the retaliation 
claim because Smith never informed Kelly Services that she had reported students for 
 
1 The District Court dismissed the § 1983 claims against the School District because 
Smith failed to plausibly allege that the School District had a policy or custom of 
tolerating racial harassment by students.  Dkt. #52 (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).  Smith does not challenge that decision in her brief 
here and we discern no error in the District Court’s decision. 
  
2 The Second Amended Complaint was filed by appointed counsel.  Counsel was later 
granted leave to withdraw and Smith then proceeded pro se.  Dkt. #59. 
 
3 Smith was accused of “busting the lip” of a student, but an investigator with the 
Department of Human Services determined that the report of child abuse was 
“unfounded.”  But Smith did admit that she grabbed the student’s shirt to get him to get 
back in line. 
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using racially abusive language (she reported students’ behavior only to certain School 
District staff).  The Court also agreed with the defendants that Smith had not established 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she experienced a hostile environment, 
as she had submitted no evidence showing that “she suffered ‘intentional discrimination 
due to . . . her race,’” or that any “abuse was ‘severe or pervasive.’”4  Dkt. #83 at 4.  As 
to the claims against the School District, the District Court determined that the School 
District was not liable for her claims as it was not Smith’s employer.  Smith timely 
appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 
280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that 
party, there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 
F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). 
To succeed on her retaliation claim, Smith would have to show:  (1) protected 
employee activity; (2) “adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous 
 
4 The Court noted that although her second amended complaint stated that she 
experienced almost “daily” racial abuse from the students and that she “repeatedly” 
reported the harassment to the school, at her deposition, she recalled just four specific 
incidents, only one of which was documented by a complaint to school officials.  And 
that report did not mention any racial abuse; instead, it simply mentioned that the student 
used “profanity.”  Dkt. #83 at 4.  The Defendants also noted in their summary judgment 
motion that of the incidents Smith recalled, only the one that was reported involved a 
racist comment directed at her.  Dkt. #72-1 at 12. 
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with the employee’s protected activity”; and (3) a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse action.  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 
193 (3d Cir. 2015).  We agree with the District Court that Smith did not proffer any 
evidence suggesting a causal connection.  Smith argues that she was fired for reporting 
racial harassment by students.  Such reporting would be “protected activity,” see id., but 
as the District Court noted, Kelly Services could not have fired Smith because she 
reported student behavior if it did not know that she had made such reports.5   
As to her hostile work environment claim, even if we assume for the sake of 
argument that Smith established a genuine issue of material fact regarding what she 
experienced at work, Smith has not explained why Kelly Services should be liable, since 
she did not establish that it was aware of the situation.  See Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that an employer can be liable for a 
hostile environment only if it “knew or should have known of the harassment and failed 
to take prompt remedial action”).  As for the School District, Smith concedes that the 
School District was not her employer, which is a requirement for liability under Title 
 
5 Smith also argues in her brief that Kelly Services’ “no-touch” policy violates 
Pennsylvania law.  Whether Kelly Services may hold its employees to a more rigorous 
standard than other teachers is not properly before us, as the issue does not affect whether 
Smith was discharged as retaliation for protected conduct. 
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VII,6 the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,7 and the Philadelphia Fair Practices 
Ordinance,8 and she has explained no other basis for liability. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 
7 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955. 
 
8 Phila. Code § 9-1103. 
